Distributed Byzantine-Resilient Multiple-Message Dissemination in Wireless Networks
Abstract : The byzantine model is widely used to depict a variety of node faults in networks. Previous studies on byzantine-resilient protocols in wireless networks assume reliable communications and do not consider the jamming behavior of byzantine nodes. Such jamming, however, is a very critical and realistic behavior to be considered in modern wireless networks. In this paper, for the first time, we integrate the jamming behavior of byzantine nodes into the network setting. We show that, in this much more comprehensive and harsh model, efficient distributed communication protocols can be still devised with elaborate protocol design. In particular, we developed an algorithm that can accomplish the basic multiple-message dissemination task close to the optimal solution in terms of running time. Empirical results validate the byzantine-resilience and efficiency of our algorithm.
? An important distinguishing element of these networks from “standard” networks is that they do not rely on any pre-existing infrastructure or management authority.
? This allows all nodes to learn about the existence of messages they did not receive either due to collisions or due to a Byzantine behavior by an overlay node.
? Thus, it tells the VERBOSE failure detector to suspect a given node only if some other nodes have sent messages with a given message; the existence of such messages “prove” that the node in question has generated an unnecessary message.
? An appealing property of the protocol is that it only requires the existence of one correct node in each one-hop neighborhood.
? The problem of secure multicast in wireless networks was less studied and only outside attacks were addressed.
? Most of the work addressing application security issues related to multicast in wireless networks focused on the problem of group key management in order to ensure data confidentiality and authenticity.
? We show through simulations that the impact of several Byzantine attacks (flood rushing, black hole and wormhole) on a previously proposed secure multicast routing protocol is considerable and cannot be ignored.
? Flood rushing has a noticeable impact especially for small group sizes and for low mobility levels.
• A framework for fault-tolerance by adaptation was proposed. In this framework, a simple protocol is run during normal operation alongside some failure detection mechanism.
• Mute failure detectors were initially proposed in order to solve Byzantine Consensus in otherwise asynchronous systems.
• Another secure routing protocol (SRP) has been proposed in. SRP requires a secure association between each pair of source and destination but assumes that Byzantine nodes do not collude.
• Also, the works in have proposed a formal framework for defining and implementing reliable multicast protocols in a hybrid failure environment (Byzantine, crash, and omission) based on modern cryptography.
? We present next a more efficient strategy, which can reduce the computational load on tree nodes, especially under ideal conditions.
? Strategic positioning has a crippling effect on the performance of A-MAODV even more when adversaries explicitly join the multicast group.
? A more efficient strategy is that a node concatenates its identifier and rate to MRATE only if the node’s perceived rate is smaller than the last recorded rate in MRATE by more than d.
? This hop count authentication mechanism is used by the group leader when sending tree token and MRATE messages. It is also used during route discovery to allow nodes that forward a route reply message to prove their hop distance from the tree node that initiated the route reply message .
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